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We use a two-country-three-sector DSGE model to analyse adjustment in the Euro area. In 
particular we distinguish between tradeables and non tradeables and further disaggregate non 
tradeables into housing and services. We analyse the experience of six countries which have 
shown strong divergences in the early years of the euro area, namely Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The framework allows us to replicate actual developments 
in euro-area Member States using a model that is inherently stable. We find that to a large 
extent, the diverging growth and inflation developments and current account shifts can be 
attributed to one-off adjustment to EMU which broadly seems to have run its course. The 
absence of an exchange risk premium in EMU allows an increase in capital mobility resulting 
in a lower correlation between domestic savings and investment. Increased capital mobility 
seems to have been an important driving force behind the current account dynamics. Due to the 
absence of risk premia, investment – and especially housing investment - responds strongly to 












 This paper presents in more detail a model analysis of adjustment experiences in EMU member states, which 
appeared in the EU Economy Review 2006. We are indebted to our colleagues in DG ECFIN for many helpful 
discussions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as those of the 
European Commission.   2
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1.   Introduction  
In the run-up to the launch of the euro area, there were two broad schools of thought on how individual member 
countries would be affected by entry into the monetary union.
1 The discussion boiled down to two issues: Firstly, the 
frequency and importance of idiosyncratic economic shocks to Member States leading to asymmetric developments 
and, secondly, the effectiveness of adjustment to such shocks which depended on the relative strength of the 
stabilising forces of competitive pressures and the destabilising effects of the – generally pro-cyclical - real interest 
rates. 
On the one side were those who believed that the member countries were too diverse leading to many important 
asymmetric economic developments. In their view, the common monetary policy would turn out to be pro-cyclical 
and destabilising leading to protracted boom-bust cycles. Proponents of this view put the EMU project into question, 
considering that it implied economic instability resulting in inefficient resource allocation. 
On the other side were those who believed that the single currency in itself would generate forces for greater 
economic integration and economic stabilisation. The importance of increased trade competition and financial 
integration would in their view reduce the frequency and importance of asymmetric shocks. And when they occurred, 
competitive pressures would induce rapid and effective adjustment. EMU would be inherently stable and benefits of 
the monetary union would outweigh the costs in terms of the loss of the exchange rate and monetary policy.  
                                                 
1   Lane (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of the issues at hand and reviews the evidence from the early years of EMU to investigate the 
performance of these hypotheses. 
Looking at the developments since the launch of the euro area, economic performances have differed markedly 
between Member States. Differences in price and wage inflation have been substantial, perversely affecting real 
interest rates in the national economies. Moreover, inflation differentials have been particularly persistent, also 
compared to the experience in the US. This persistence implies large shifts in measures of competitiveness and in 
particular real effective exchange rates. At the same time, substantial and persistent current account imbalances have 
emerged. 
It is still difficult to arrive at precise estimates on the impact of the individual channels. We approach this issue by 
asking the question how well a standard DSGE model - which makes strong predictions about the stability of a 
monetary union provided that the Central Bank targets the area wide inflation rate - can account for the stylised facts 
on growth, inflation and current account divergences in EMU. We identify shocks and estimate their order of 
magnitude by means of shock accounting. The analysis applies to both adjustment in the euro area on entry and 
adjustment in the euro area in its steady state. This framework allows us to assess shocks that trigger adjustment 
dynamics and to pinpoint which factors determine the speed of adjustment and the risk of overshooting. Models of 
this kind have been used by Fagan and Gaspar (2005) to study the current account developments and by Lopez de 
Salido et al. (2005) to investigate inflation differentials in EMU. However, to our knowledge no attempt has been 
made so far to look at various developments and channels simultaneously. 
The countries that we consider in the simulations are: Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
The Netherlands and Portugal, in particular, experienced high growth and overheating pressures towards the end of 
the 1990s and early 2000s. The subsequent slowdown was characterised by a drop in inflation, downward revisions 
of potential growth and a marked deterioration in the budgetary position. Other Member States have not seen a 
similar reversal in their economic fortunes. In Spain, economic growth and inflation continue to be above the euro-
area average. These developments have been paralleled by high wage growth, booming asset prices and credit 
growth, and deteriorating current account balances. The experience of Germany in the euro area has been 
characterised by a protracted period of slow growth. This period of slow growth and lacklustre domestic demand has 
been accompanied by low inflation and wage growth and the regaining of competitiveness. Italy can be considered 
the “odd man out” with a continuous loss in competitiveness coinciding with slow growth.   4
 
2.  Stylised developments  
SF 1 – Inflation differentials have narrowed but remain substantial and particularly persistent 
 
From the early 1990s until the start of EMU, inflation differentials between euro-area Member States narrowed 
continuously (graph 1). After some increase in 2000, the measures of inflation differentials stabilised. The substantial 
range and standard deviation as such may not be particularly remarkable. Looking at the deviations of inflation from 
the euro-area average in individual Member States, the persistence is notable. Germany has consistently shown the 
lowest rate of inflation, while Spanish inflation has continuously been 2 percentage points above the euro-area 
average. The resulting cumulative divergence of price level developments and its impact on competitiveness within 
the euro-area sparked political and research interest.      
 
Graph 1: Standard Deviation and Range of 
Inflation Rates of the Member States of the 
Eurozone (1991-2005) 
 
Source: Commission services, own calculations 
Note: Dispersion of National Inflation Rates based on the National 
Consumer Price Index, 1991-2005. Standard deviation on the left 
scale, Range (=maximum minus minimum) on the right scale. 
 
 















Source: Commission services 
 
SF 2 – Differences in unit labour costs reflect stem from very different productivity and wage trends 
 
The dispersion in inflation rates is also broadly reflected in unit labour costs in the period 1999-2005 (graph 3). Of 
the 6 Member States considered, only Germany witnessed unit labour costs increases below the euro area average, 
due solely to nominal wage restraint. In the other countries, the underlying factors of the unit labour cost increase 
reflect quite diverse developments of nominal wage and labour productivity developments. Nominal wages in 
general did not move in line with productivity advances. Especially in Portugal and Spain, negative labour 






























Graph 3: Average annual changes in unit labour costs, wages and 













Source: Commission services 
 
SF 3 – Inflation dispersion was concentrated in the non-tradable sector, in particular building and 
construction.  
 
The different price developments are not spread homogeneously throughout the economy. Distinguishing between 
developments in the tradeable- and non-tradeable sectors appears crucial to understand inflation persistence. The 
standard deviation and the range of average annual inflation rates was significantly larger in services, which 
represents to a large extent the non-tradable sector, than in goods, which are largely tradable (table 1).    
 Table 1: Average Annual Inflation Rates (1999-2004) 
  Standard deviation Range  (Max.-Min.) 
 
Goods    0.6    1.2 
Services    1.6    4.1 
Source: Lane (2006) 
A look at the price deflators for manufacturing, services and building and constructions shows similar developments 
(Graph 4). It also shows that there have been no reversals of relative price levels towards the euro area average in the 
individual Member States highlighting the persistence of high or low inflation in the individual Member States. The 
charts illustrates that the lower the tradable character of the sector is; the higher is the cumulative difference in price 
developments. In the manufacturing sector cumulative difference in price developments since 1999 ranged up to 14 
percentage points, whereas this cumulative price deflator differential amounted to around 20 percentage points in the 
(largely) non-tradable service sector. The price deflator differential is even more pronounced in the building and 
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Graph 4: Price deflators for the sectors manufacturing, service and building and construction 1995-2004 
























































































































































Source: Commission services 
Note: no data for Ireland available 
 
 
SF 4 – Housing price developments have been very marked and persistent  
 
Deviations of housing price increases from the euro-area average have been remarkable. Graph 5 (left) shows that 
there has been a reversal of fortunes only once in the case of the Netherlands and Portugal that saw relative price 
declines compared to the euro area after a period of buyant growth. In the other Member States the persistence of the 
deviation from the euro-area average since 1999 is remarkable. Housing prices in Spain have grown at a 
continuously accelerating rate compared to the euro area, while in Germany the rate of price declines accelerated 
continuously.   
Graph 5: Housing price index and annual growth rates (compared to the euro area) 1995-2004  
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SF 5 – Current account imbalances have widened  
    
The dispersion of current account positions within the euro area has widened significantly since the late 1990s. 
Graph 6 illustrates the development of the current account balances in the euro-area Member States through time 
from 1995 to 2004. In a context of free flow of capital (and no risk premia), one would expect countries with high 
growth potential to run current-account deficits and low-growth countries to run surpluses as capital searches for the 
highest return if there are no risk premia. The graph therefore depicts the development of the current account against 
the GDP per capita which can be considered as a proxy for possible return on investment and scope for catching-up 
dynamics. 
On the horizontal axis, GDP per capita is depicted (euro area = 100). The vertical axis represents the current account 
balance of euro-area Member States with the rest of the world minus the weighted euro-area average current account 
balance with the rest of the world.  
In 1995 the correlation is still negligible. Only Austria and Germany have a current account deficit compared to the 
rest of the euro area. By 2002, only countries with a GDP per capita below the euro-area average have a significant 
current account deficit.  
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Source: Commission services 
A trend towards rising current account dispersion was also observed in economies world-wide. Still, while it is not a 
euro-area phenomenon, the deterioration in the net external asset positions in Portugal, Greece and Spain is 
unmatched in the OECD and by historical standards.     
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SF 6 – Exchange risk premia disappeared  
    
Globalisation, financial market developments, a search for return as nominal returns declined in low inflation 
environment may all have contributed to a global decline in the risk premia. The decline in the risk premia has been 
most pronounced in the euro-area Member States as the creation of the euro area eliminated exchange rate risk.  
 
Graph 7: Exchange risk premia vis-à-vis Germany
















3.  Analysing the characteristics of adjustment in EMU 
3.1  The DSGE model 
The analysis of adjustment dynamics in the euro area is based on simulations with a two-country-three-sector model 
that distinguishes between tradeables and non-tradeables. The tradeable sector consists of agriculture and 
manufacturing, while the non-tradeable sector is composed of construction and services. The model is a so-called 
New-Keynesian-DSGE model
3. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we have introduced a number of nominal 
and real rigidities
4. This makes the model partly forward and partly backward looking. The model can be calibrated 
to various country pairs. In the simulations below, one country is analysed while the second country represents the 
aggregate of the rest of the euro area. The model is calibrated so as to respect the relative sizes of the countries. 
                                                 
2   The exchange risk premium of country  { } IE PT NL IT ES C , , , , ∈  is calculated on the basis of an uncovered interest parity condition and 
defined as 
e
j t e j j
DE
t i C
t i t rprem + Δ + − = 12 ) (  ,  j=3. 
For calculating the risk premium we use monthly data on interest rates (per annum) and exchange rates. The interest rates are 3 month 
money market rates. For the expected change in the exchange rate we use the log difference between the monthly exchange rate in t+3 and t. 
Notice, instead of the expected exchange rate we use the realised rate. This is not very restrictive since we are only interested in the average 
risk premium over the year.  
 
3   See for instance Smets and Wouters (2003). 
4   Parameter values are taken from a DSGE model that was estimated for the euro area by Ratto, Roeger and In't Veld (2006).   9
In the short run nominal rigidities are important in the model, while in the medium and long run prices and wages 
adjust. For each permanent and temporary shock the model reaches a long-run equilibrium position that is consistent 
with external and internal balance. Internal balance is characterised by a constant employment rate and a constant 
ratio of consumption to GDP (savings rate), while external balance is characterised by a constant (not necessarily 
zero) ratio of net foreign assets to GDP and a constant real exchange rate. 
Given the heterogeneous pattern of house price developments across the euro area, the model has been extended 
further by disaggregating the non-tradeable sector into construction and "other" non-tradeables and by separating 
investment into housing and non-housing investment. The housing market boom in several Member States was 
accompanied by very strong credit expansion. The liberalisation of the mortgage markets and increased competition 
between mortgage providers led to the introduction of new mortgage products that postpone loan redemption until 
maturity. These developments, also fuelled by the falling nominal interest rates at the end of the 1990s which 
increased the borrowing capacity of households, resulted in significant re-mortgaging and equity withdrawal that fed 
into private consumption expenditure in several Member States. The degree to which these developments affected 
lending practices differed among Member States. To capture the strong divergence in credit growth, special 
emphasis has been devoted to modelling the financial constraints of the household sector. To this end, the household 
sector has been divided into credit and non credit-constrained parts
5, which allows consideration of the effects of 
loosening credit constraints on the demand for housing. A more formal presentation of the model can be found in the 
Appendix.  
Box:  Inflation differentials and investment in the DSGE model 
 
In a monetary union, with interest rates targeted at the union's average economic conditions, investment in individual member 
states could potentially respond strongly to domestic demand shocks. An increase in domestic inflation could boost domestic 
investment because of lower real interest rates. This mechanism could transform temporary demand shocks into long investment 
induced cycles. An often used counterargument is that with a monetary union, the relevant real rate for investors is not 
necessarily the national rate but the union average real rate.  
Here we describe how investment is modelled in the DSGE model. In the model, sectoral investment differs according to the 
degree to which sectors are exposed to foreign competition and to the mix of domestic and foreign capital used in their 
production.  In other words, the investment decision is based on demand and cost factors and relative prices have different effects 
on both components entering the investment decision. While it is true that higher inflation can (under certain conditions, see 
below) lower capital costs for firms if the nominal interest rate stays constant, DSGE models also stress a demand (or 
competitiveness effect) for investment. Besides capital costs, in their investment decisions, profit maximising firms take into 
account the evolution of their own output price relative to those of their (foreign) competitors over the lifetime of the investment 
project, since this relative price determines current and expected demand. Since higher domestic inflation worsens the 
competitive condition of domestic firms, the demand effect works in the opposite direction to that of the cost effect. It can be a 
powerful stabilising force especially if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is high. Obviously, the 
demand effect is most effective in the tradeable sector while it is much weaker in the non tradeable sector (including housing). In 
the DSGE model used for this analysis the following distinction is made between the tradeable and non tradeable sectors 
concerning their exposure to foreign competition and to the composition of investment.  
Composition of investment (costs): 
It is assumed that investment in the non-tradeable sector is largely domestically produced. Housing investment is undertaken by a 
domestic construction sector. The tradeable sector uses both domestic and imported investment goods. Four factors determine the 
capital costs of a firm:  
  1.  Physical rate of depreciation. 
 2.  Corporate  taxes. 
  3.  Real interest rate: nominal interest rate minus the expected capital gain, expressed by the expected inflation 
    rate of the capital aggregate used by the specific firm. 
  4.  The price of the investment good relative to the producer price of the investing firm. 
Suppose the composition of investment of a particular sector s in country c is made up of a composite good of the currency union 
with shares proportional to the size of the union members, then the relevant real interest rate would be the nominal interest rate 
minus the expected inflation rate of investment goods in the currency union. However, even in this particular case, domestic 
inflation could still lower real capital costs, if the inflation in the domestic tradable sector exceeds investment price inflation. For 
the non tradeable sector, it is assumed that all investment is domestic (in particular for housing). Therefore, the real interest rate 
for investment in the non tradeable sector is defined as the union-wide nominal rate minus the expected inflation in the non 
tradeable sector.  
                                                 
5    In standard macro models (like QUEST, for example) households are usually divided into liquidity- and non-liquidity- constrained 
households. Liquidity constrained households do not borrow at all but only consume current income. Housing investment is not modelled as 
a decision of the household sector but is part of the corporate investment decision. In this model we derive a housing investment equation 
explicitly from a decision problem of the household sector. Also, we allow all households to be able to borrow but assume that a fraction of 
households are credit constrained in the sense that existing collateral, in the form of the stock of housing wealth, puts a limit on the amount 
of period t borrowing. The price of housing consists of the price of land and the price of the house construction.      10
Exposure to competition (demand): 
Domestic firms in the tradeable sector are exposed to competition from foreign firms in the tradeable sector. Here we assume a 
high elasticity of substitution (between 2.5 and 7.0) between domestic and foreign tradeables. The domestic tradeable sector is 
also exposed to competition from domestic non tradeables to the extent that domestic households and firms regard tradeable and 
non tradeable goods as substitutes. Following the literature, we impose a low elasticity of substitution of 0.4. As a mirror image, 
firms in the non tradeable sector are exposed to (weak) competition from the tradeable sector. 
As a result of these assumptions the model predicts that investment in the non tradeable sector should respond more strongly to 
demand shocks than investment in the tradeable sector.  
The model simulations allow us to systematically analyse the possible origins of sustained differences in economic 
variables in the euro area. Three origins of the divergences of the economic developments and their persistence are 
considered in the economic literature: (i) they can boil down to dissimilar supply conditions. As such, they do not 
need to hamper the smooth functioning of the monetary union; (ii) they can be the result of one-off adjustment 
effects caused by the adaptation to the monetary union. After the completion of the initial adjustment their effects on 
growth and inflation will fade out; (iii) a third possible source would be the occurrence of asymmetric shocks in 
EMU at its steady state. These can be due to common external shocks with different effects in the Member States 
due to differences in industrial structure and sectoral specialisation
6, or to differences in geographical compositions 
of the trading partners. They can also be due to movements in critical domestic variables.  
 
3.2  Standard simulations 
This section presents some standard simulation results for the type of exogenous shocks that have been important for 
the euro-area economies in recent years. Some of the idiosyncratic shocks are related to the establishment of the euro 
area, such as the elimination of currency risk premia (ES, PT, IT, IE) and the further integration of financial markets, 
but also increased trade, which is likely to have enhanced competition in the tradeable sector. However, euro-area 
members were also exposed to other important idiosyncratic structural changes. Some countries in the euro area 
experienced idiosyncratic shocks to TFP in both the tradeable (IE, IT) and non-tradeable sectors (DE, ES, PT), 
population/immigration shocks (ES, IR), labour supply shocks (DE, ES, IE), investment shocks (DE) and shifts in 
the composition of demand (more demand for non tradeables) (ES, PT) and fiscal policy shocks (NL, IT).  
                                                 
6   Differences  in  industrial structure may expose Member States differently to sectoral price and demand developments and sectoral 
competition from inside or outside the monetary union. When the industrial structure deviates strongly between Member States and a 
Member State has a high degree of sectoral specialisation, the equilibrium real exchange rate may be affected if relative prices between 
sectors change. While real productivity is unaffected, the relative price change alters the value productivity in the sector. While each worker 
may produce the same output as before, the value of this output is reduced. Thereby equilibrium wages are reduced. Real wages have to 
decline to the new level of marginal value productivity, while sectoral adjustment takes place. The effects depend on the (perceived) 
persistence of the price shock.        11
Graph S1: Increase of tradeable sector TFP by 1% (for one year) 
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Notes: all variables are expressed in terms of deviations form baseline. The time interval on the horizontal axis is a year.  
GGDPR: Growth rate of real GDP; GC: Growth rate of private consumption;  
GYL: growth rate of labour productivity; INFPGDP: Inflation (GDP deflator); INFW: Wage inflation; 
L: Employment rate; GINV: Growth rate of investment; GTOT: growth of terms of trade; 
CA: current account as a percentage of GDP  
Graph S.1 shows the Balassa-Samuelson effect, namely the effect of an increase in the growth rate of TFP in the 
tradeable sector of 1% over one year, i.e. a permanent increase in the level of TFP in the tradeable sector
7. A shock 
to technical progress has a GDP growth effect extending over 2 years. GDP growth returns to the baseline, but, 
investment growth falls below the baseline. The overshooting of investment is due to an interest rate effect as the 
increase in tradeable TFP growth increases inflation and lowers the real interest rate. Among the investment 
components, it is housing investment that responds most vigorously to the shock. This is because the real interest 
rate for housing investment declines most strongly. Why is inflation generated with a positive TFP shock? The TFP 
shock in the tradeable sector leads to lower costs and higher wages in the tradeable sector. Both effects roughly 
compensate for one another and there is no effect on tradeable prices. Labour mobility across sectors exerts upward 
pressure on wages in the non-tradeable sector, which leads to rising inflation for non tradeables. The inflation in the 
non tradeable sector is also the reason for an increase in non-tradeable (especially housing) investment. 
Since the price of non-tradeables rises, overall inflation increases, but tradeable-goods inflation does not rise. 
Nevertheless, there is a small deterioration of the current account due to an income effect. Even a temporary shock 
has some persistent price effects. Both price and wage inflation diverge over a period of 4 years. 
                                                 
7   A catching-up economy is hit by a sequence of positive TFP shocks. A single shock is given in the illustration to reveal the dynamic 
adjustment patterns more clearly.     12
Graph S2: Increase of non-tradeable TFP by 1.0% in the first year 
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The positive TFP shock in the non-tradeable sector increases GDP and investment growth over a period of 5 years. 
In contrast to the positive productivity shock in the tradeable sector, this shock is not inflationary. In fact, lower 
costs in non tradeables translate into lower prices (so that nominal wages remain unchanged). However, price 
stickiness in the non-tradeable sector prevents prices from falling sufficiently. This induces a lack of demand and 
firms respond to this by lowering employment which also prevents wages from rising. Both Portugal and Spain have 
shown below average TFP growth in the non tradeable sector, which explains some of the inflation divergence.  
Graph S3: Labour supply permanent shock of +0.5 percentage points 
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A labour market reform shock – modelled by a downward shift in the wage setting rule – leads to a gradual decrease 
in wage inflation (nominal and real). However, this effect is only temporary and reverses after 5 years. But there is a 
permanent increase in employment. Both effects together lead to a permanent increase in wage income. 
Interestingly, this leads to a relatively strong increase in housing investment. Notice that ES and IE, as well as NL 
have experienced a housing boom associated with a declining structural rate of unemployment.    13
Graph S4: Risk premium reduction by 0.5 of a percentage point 
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One of the most important effects associated with entry into the euro area was the elimination of exchange rate risk 
premia in countries like Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is modelled as permanent reduction of the risk premium 
in one period (in fact, in the euro area, it was a gradual decline in two to three years preceding EMU). A 
conservative estimate suggests an effect on real interest rates of -0.5 percentage points. It has a rather strong effect 
on investment, and especially on non-tradeable investment (housing). Another interesting feature is the strong 
increase of consumption. Notice also, in contrast to investment which shows a pattern of overshooting (positive 
growth rates followed by negative growth rates), the consumption growth remains high over a longer period. It is 
especially this feature which induces long-lasting current account deterioration. What explains the difference 
between the consumption and the investment response? The reduction in the risk premium leads to higher 
investment as the economy adjusts to higher aggregate capital intensity. Once the adjustment to higher capital 
intensity is completed investment falls back to previous levels. Thus a reduction in the risk premium only has a 
short- to medium-term effect on investment with the adjustment period depending on adjustment rigidities. For 
consumption, the permanent income model predicts a longer lasting effect. Because the reduction of real interest 
rates increases the present discounted value of income it becomes easier for the household to borrow against future 
income. This raises the level of consumption. An interesting feature of this experiment is the order of magnitude of 
the current account deficit, which is up by more than 1 percentage point for several years following the decline in the 
risk premium.  A change in the currency risk premium with entry into EMU is therefore a primary candidate for 
explaining why the current account balance deteriorated strongly in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and - as a 
mirror image - improved in Germany.   14
Graph S5: Increasing the demand for housing (10% increase in housing share parameter) 
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A shift in the preference for housing (e.g. due to a change in the age composition of the population (or foreign 
purchases of houses (ES)) has a strong effect on housing investment and initially hardly any crowding-out effect on 
other types of investment. Since the demand shift generates inflation for houses and other non tradeables, the real 
interest rate declines and the housing boom are sustained for another two years. However, this is followed by a 
longer period of negative investment growth in housing and non-tradeables of the order of magnitude of 0.6% p.a. 
Interestingly, the demand shift for housing is associated with a positive labour supply response. This is because the 
fall in consumption induces a rise in labour supply.  
 
Graph S6:  Population shock (10 years, anticipated, +1 per cent) 
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A population/immigration shock – especially if anticipated – has a powerful effect on investment demand, in 
particular non-tradeableinvestment (housing). It also increases house price inflation. The increase in housing demand 
takes place at the expense of private consumption. Immigration also raises the employment rate and, therefore, 
increases the growth of GDP per capita. Immigration is also associated with an increase in the current account 
deficit. A positive population shock has been experienced by Spain and Ireland. 
   15
Graph S7:  Reduction in mark-up due to openness 
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In the trade literature it is argued that monetary unions increases trade within participant countries. This in turn 
enhances competition, which leads to higher productivity growth and employment. The channel through which these 
effects are generated is via reductions in the mark up in the tradeable sector. Recent empirical work by Kee and 
Hoeckman (2003), Chen, Imbs and Scott (2004), and Badinger and Breuss (2005) suggests that an increase in the 
import share of 1 percentage point could lower mark ups in the tradeable sector in the order of magnitude of 0.1% to 
0.2%. Increased competition in the tradeable sector raises labour demand and investment, which drives up wage 
inflation in the tradeable sector. This causes wage increases in the non-tradeable sector and generates inflation in the 
non-tradeable sector. Inflation in non tradeables dominates the inflation-reducing effect in the non tradeable sector. 
This effect helps to explain the performance of the Spanish manufacturing sector in recent years. 
Graph S8:  Entering EMU with an overvalued exchange   rate (5%) 
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In the model an overvaluation of 5% leads to output loss of -3.3% in the first year. Prices in the tradeable sector 
decline by 2.1% in the first year, by 1.6 in the second and by .4 in the third year. After three years prices have 
adjusted sufficiently and the competitiveness loss from the overvaluation is eliminated. In the non tradeable sector 
the price decline is slightly more sluggish. It is interesting to notice that the overvaluation shock has a strong   16
negative effect on non tradeableinvestment, because of the real interest rate effect, while the effect on 
tradeableinvestment is less strong.  
 
Graph S9:  Increase of government demand (1% of GDP for one year) 
A: GDP,PRODUCTIVITY,EMPLOYMENT
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This experiment shows how the economy responds to a temporary increase in government expenditure in a single 
country within EMU. The fiscal multiplier is positive in the first year and slightly below one. The increase in 
government demand also has a positive short run employment effect. In the short run the model shows a typical 
Keynesian response to a (temporary) demand shock
8. The positive effect is mainly due to the sluggish adjustment of 
prices and the desire of consumers to smooth consumption. However, the increase in government expenditure 
reduces private demand, in particular investment. This suggests that there is a possibility for countercyclical fiscal 
interventions, however there are clear intertemporal trade offs associated fiscal policy, a positive effect in the first 
year is followed by a negative effect in the second year. This suggests that fiscal instruments should be used with 
caution.  
 
3.3  International spillover of shocks within the euro area 
One important issue within a monetary union is the transmission of shocks across Member States. There are various 
channels of shock transmission, namely an income channel, a competitiveness channel and an interest rate channel. 
In this section we will analyse how (asymmetric) inflationary shocks in the rest of the euro area affect a particular 
Member State (the home country), which is assumed to have a GDP share of 10% in the euro-area. The shocks we 
consider are: a negative TFP shock to the non-tradeable sector, a positive TFP shock to tradeables, and an increase in 
housing demand. The graphs S10-S12 below show how these particular shocks, which originate in the rest of the 
euro-area affect an individual member state which is not directly exposed to these shocks. 
                                                 
8   For permanent fiscal shocks, the fiscal multiplier becomes smaller and can even turn negative.   17
Graph S10: Reduction of non-tradeable TFP by 1.0% in the first year 
A: GDP,PRODUCTIVITY,EMPLOYMENT
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The spillover effect of slower TFP growth in the RoEA on the home country GDP is sizeable (-0.18 of a percentage 
point lower growth in the home country vs. -0.33 of a percentage point lower growth in the RoEA), especially in the 
short run (i.e. the first two years). The main transmission channel is a monetary policy response. The central bank 
responds to the inflationary shock with an increase in interest rates. This dampens aggregate demand and inflation in 
the home country and leads to temporary decline in growth., GDP in the home country starts to recover slowly, 
starting in the third year after the shock has occurred.       
Graph S11: Increase of tradeable TFP by 1.0% in the first year 
A: GDP,PRODUCTIVITY,EMPLOYMENT
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The spillover effect of higher productivity growth in the tradeable sector is negative but small. While the effect on 
GDP growth in the RoEA in the first year is 0.18 of a percentage point of additional growth, the spillover effect is 
negative (-0.1 of a percentage point in the first year). The smaller size of the spillover effect is explained by two 
factors. First, the tradeable sector is smaller (only 50% of the size of the non-tradeable sector) and, second, the 
contractionary monetary response is accompanied by a positive income effect from an increase in demand in the 
faster growing RoEA.   18
Graph S12: Increase of housing demand (plus 10 percentage points permanent) 
A: GDP,PRODUCTIVITY,EMPLOYMENT
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An increase in housing demand in the RoEA is negatively transmitted to the home country. A shock to housing 
demand increases GDP growth in the RoEA by 0.45 of a percentage point in the first year (and by 0.65 of a 
percentage point in the second year) but leads to reduced growth in the home country by about 0.1 of a percentage 
point in the first year (and by 0.03 of a percentage point in the second year). The relatively strong spillover comes 
from the fact that demand in the RoEA is shifting away from tradeables to non tradeables i.e. the home country not 
only suffers from a contractionary monetary policy response but also from a loss in demand for tradeables. 
 
4.  Country dynamics 
In this section we apply the model to Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain which have 
shown the largest deviation from the Euro area in terms of growth, inflation and the current account. The goal of this 
exercise is to see whether this model can approximately match orders of magnitude of deviations of important macro 
aggregates from the Euro area average as well as account for the duration of these deviations. We don't have the 
intention of fitting the variables exactly. An exact fit is not possible since we base our analysis only on a very small 
set of exogenous shocks.  
Table 3.1: Exogenous Driving Forces (1999-2003) 









Germany 3.4  1.7  0  -2.0 
Ireland 15.8  3.2  60  21.1 
Italy 0.7  0.0  90  6.8 
Netherlands 2.8 1.5 0  22.5 
Portugal 2.0  0.5  140  24.8 
Spain 1.8  0.1  90  23.8 
Euro area  2.8  0.9     
Source: GGDC sectoral data base, AMECO 
*Primary production and manufacturing (average productivity p.a. growth 1999-2003 in %). 
**Private services (average productivity growth p.a. 1999-2003 in %). 
***Assumed values calculated over the period 1995-1998. Ex post estimates from open arbitrage 
conditions give larger absolute values. However these estimates are dominated by outliers and 
therefore likely to be biased upwards. 
****Difference between 2005 and 1999 as a % of GDP. 
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The table shows the country specific development ('shocks') on which we focus. First, on the supply side these are 
differences in TFP trends in the tradeable and non tradeable sector. Second, related to the creation of EMU, changes 
in the exchange risk premia could be an important factor explaining some of the country specific developments in 
the early years of EMU. Third, on the demand side, financial market liberalisation and innovation has led to the 
introduction of new lending instruments which have effectively increased credit ceilings for housing investment of 
private households. Credit expansion has been particularly strong in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. 
Apart from these shocks we also take into account fiscal developments and some other country specific shocks 
which will be explained in more detail in the respective country sections.  
 
4.1  Germany 
Stylised facts (see table DE-1) 
Germany's growth performance (in per capita terms) has been disappointing in the first few years after the creation 
of the euro area. However, after a particularly weak performance in 1999, the growth rate gradually caught up with 
the euro-area average. In the last two years, Germany has slightly exceeded per capita growth in the euro area. The 
slow growth performance in the first years of the euro area is somewhat surprising given the above average TFP 
growth, especially in the non-tradeable sector. Most observers of the German economy attribute the sluggish growth 
to weak domestic demand, especially investment and construction. Consistent with the hypothesis of weak demand, 
inflation has been persistently below the euro-area average by about 1 percentage point p.a. Rising current surpluses 
(reaching close to 4% of GDP in 2005) further support the view that Germany is facing a demand problem. 
 
Shocks 
In this section we explore how in the context of the model, specific demand and supply shocks hitting the German 
economy could have contributed to these growth and inflation trends. On the demand side there are various 
explanatory factors. Germany entered EMU at a slightly overvalued exchange rate
9 and lost a negative risk premium 
vis-à-vis euro area competitors associated with the reputation of the DM. Though these developments may also 
partly explain weak demand, most likely other more structural factors play a role as well. Probably weak demand for 
housing is also due to a correction of overinvestment during the unification induced construction boom in the mid 
90s. However, housing investment is not sufficient to explain the slowdown in investment; business investment has 
been particularly weak as well. A possible explanation advanced by Broadbent et al. (2004) is structural changes in 
the German banking system which could have increased capital costs for firms by 200BP
10. This estimate appears 
high. The DSGE model replicates the low investment rate with a 30BP increase of capital costs. Low consumption 
growth is possibly due to precautionary savings in a context of uncertainty surrounding pension and labour market 
reforms and anticipation of future taxation to adjust public finance imbalances in the light of the ageing population. 
The observed high productivity growth in non tradeables could be a supply side explanation for low inflation.  
 
Simulation results (see Graph DE-1) 
The loss of the risk premium bonus and the overvaluation can indeed explain some of the demand shortfall in the 
first two years. Eliminating the risk premium reduces housing investment growth by about 1.5 percentage points in 
the first year and close to 1% in the second year. Also the initial overvaluation had a temporary negative demand 
effect. However, it does not explain the sustained weakness of consumption and even more striking the low 
investment growth. Though housing is the investment category most affected by the elimination of the risk premium, 
a more permanent shock to housing is required in order to replicate the low growth of investment.
11 The negative 
housing shock does indeed explain a significant part of low growth in Germany (without a negative housing demand 
shock GDP growth in Germany would have been about .25 percentage points higher). But it only explains about 
10% of the inflation differential to the euro area. Low housing investment is also insufficient to completely explain 
low total investment. According to the model corporate investment should be boosted because of positive TFP 
trends. In order to account for a decline in corporate investment a shock to the required rate of return in the tradeable 
sector is given (in the order of magnitude of 50 basis points). This has a powerful effect; it not only reduces 
investment but also helps to explain some of the weakness of consumption and adds another .25 percentage point 
reduction to the inflation rate. An additional demand shock is generated by rising transfers, financed by distortionary 
                                                 
9   Real effective equilibrium exchange rate estimates suggest that most of the real appreciation had disappeared at the the end of the 90s. 
For example the estimates provided by Hansen and Roeger (2000) give an overvaluation in effective terms of 2%.  
10   This point is also made in the German country study. Broadbent et al argue that German Banks have operated with relatively low margins 
in the past. However financial market harmonisation since EMU has made it easier to compare bank performance across countries in the 
EA and Basel  II is forcing German banks to reassess the risk of outstanding loans.  
11   About 2/3 of the deviation results from a decline in the investment rate in Germany, while 1/3 is explained by an increase in the 
investment rate in the rest of the euro area. The investment shock decreases the value of housing relative to the value of consumption 
expenditure (excluding housing services) by about 5%.   20
labour taxes
12. The net effect on consumption growth is negative and adds another quarter of a percentage point to 
reducing the inflation rate in Germany in the period 2002 to 2005. Finally, high productivity growth in non 
tradeables, explains a negative inflation differential of about .33 percentage point.   
 
 
Graph DE-1:  DSGE Results for Germany (deviation from Euro area average) 
GDP, PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT













Inflation: GDP, W AGE, TOT








































Table DE-1:  Economic Development – Germany (relative to euro area) 
Variables                    1999      2000      2001      2002      2003      2004      2005 
 
Growth rate of real GDP          -0.69     -0.23     -0.20     -0.37     -0.17       0.51       0.04 
Growth rate of private consumption      -0.13     -0.36       0.40     -0.94     -0.21     -0.06     -0.84 
Growth rate of investment        -1.42     -1.99     -4.15     -4.61     -1.63     -2.48     -2.43 
Labour productivity growth           -0.31     -0.10       0.44       0.34       0.40     -0.21       0.44 
Employment rate          -0.15     -0.13     -0.51     -0.99     -1.40     -0.90     -1.17 
Inflation (GDP)          -0.51     -2.10     -1.18     -1.10     -0.98     -1.13     -1.29 
Wage inflation            -1.45     -0.56     -1.04     -1.21     -0.79     -1.81     -1.71 
Growth of terms of trade           0.55     -4.83     -0.13      2.11       1.02     -0.24     -1.52 
Current account                 -0.47       -0.91      0.69      2.95      2.82      4.44      4.66  
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 




1) Shocks related to the creation of the euro area explain GDP and its components as well as inflation in the first 2 to 
3 years. The rise in the risk premium also explains a lower permanent consumption level and a more permanent 
current account surplus (of about .6 percent of GDP)  
2) In order to match the model simulations with the data in recent years (since 2002) specific demand shocks must 
be given (especially shocks to housing investment and corporate investment in the tradeable sector plus a fiscal 
                                                 
12   While most euro area member states have lowered the share of transfers in GDP, this share has risen by about 2 percentage points in 
Germany since the mid 90s. In the simulation an increase of 1 percentage point over the period 1999 to 2005 is assumed but a further 
increase by 2% over the next decade is projected. This is less than the observed rate of increase in the last two decades and conservative 
given the demographic pressure in Germany.   21
shock to explain weak consumption growth). These demand shocks partially explain low inflation plus an increase in 
the current account surplus. 
3) On the supply side, TFP growth of non tradeables is important for two features of the German data, namely first a 
gradual recovery of German growth and second low inflation.  
4) Notice, no particular shock is given to the labour market. The demand shocks, especially housing and corporate 
investment are sufficient to generate a decline of the employment rate in the order of magnitude as observed in the 
data.  
 
4.2  Ireland 
Stylised facts (See table IR-1) 
Like no other country in the euro area, Ireland benefited from the ICT boom of the 1990s, which generated high 
rates of technical progress in the production of computers, semiconductors and telecom equipment. With a high ICT 
production share the Irish economy has exhibited very high growth rates of labour productivity. Productivity growth 
in the tradeable sector of the Irish economy exceeded that of the rest of the euro area by about 13 percentage points p 
a. on average over the period 1999-2003 . In recent years there have been some signs that the rate of technical 
progress is slowing down. However, other sectors of the economy have also scored above average in terms of 
productivity growth. In the non-tradeable sector productivity growth has been 2 percentage points higher than the 
euro-area average over the same period. High productivity growth biased towards the tradeable sector could at least 
partly explain the above-average Irish inflation rates (Balassa-Samuelson effect). The labour market may have been 
another factor adding to the persistence of inflation. The Irish employment rate increased throughout the 1990s. As 
the unemployment rate approached 4%, some wage pressure emerged eventually and the unemployment rate finally 
stabilised at a low level. On the demand side two characteristic features may be observed. First, there is strong 
housing demand with growth rates deviating from the euro-area average by about 10 percentage points p a. and 
second government consumption (as a share of GDP) has increased at an above average speed between 2000 and 
2005. Despite high domestic growth and inflation above the euro-area average, the external balance has remained 
remarkably stable, with the current account surplus deteriorating by about 2 percentage points since the late 1990s. 
In the last two years of our sample (2004 and 2005), the high growth of labour productivity came to an end in 
Ireland but employment growth has picked up once again. Also inflation has diminished very quickly in recent 
years, although wage inflation remains high. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that the employment rate and 
investment growth (both construction and equipment) has started to increase again. 
 
Shocks 
In the model the productivity trends in Ireland are implemented as supply shocks to tradeables and non tradeables 
TFP such that the model replicates the productivity growth differential between Ireland and the rest of EMU as well 
as the productivity growth differential between the tradeable and non tradeable sector in the Irish economy. After the 
year 2000 a negative wage shock is removed in order to replicate the end of wage moderation in Ireland. Some 
idiosyncratic demand shocks can also be identified. From 2000 to 2005 the share of government consumption in 
GDP has increased by 2 percentage points, (compared to an increase below 1 percentage point in the Euro area). 
There is also empirical evidence of liberalised mortgage markets allowing rising household debt. Like in the case of 
Spain the housing boom is to some extent an autonomous demand shock fuelled by demographics and catching up 
processes. Some attention is devoted to the last two years, where we can observe a decline in the growth rate of GDP 
and a fall of productivity growth below the euro area average. Within the context of the model a possible 
explanation for a simultaneous drop in productivity and inflation could be a decline in TFP growth in the tradeable 
sector. In order to make these two developments consistent with no fall in wage inflation, rising employment shares 
and continued investment growth (both construction and equipment), increased competition in the non tradeable 
sector must be assumed
13. 
 
Simulations (see Graph IR-1) 
According to the model simulations, the TFP shocks are the most important factors for explaining the productivity 
trend in Ireland and other stylised facts. Tradeable sector TFP growth explains a productivity differential of about 
2.5% from 1999 to 2003. Productivity growth in the tradeable sector leads to (GDP) inflation with a certain lag (see 
standard simulation) via second round effects through wages and prices in the non tradeable sector. Eventually the 
                                                 
13   The recent development of manufacturing and service prices supports this view. Manufacturing inflation has increased sharply since the 
beginning of 2004 while service sector inflation has declined from about 7% over the period 2000 to 2003 to about 3.5% over the period 
2004/05. (see, Irish CB Quaterly Bulletin, April 2006).  The Irish CB attributes the decline in service prices at least in part to increased 
competition in home and transport insurance and the communications sector.     22
inflation differential exceeds the productivity differential by about 30%. Productivity growth in the non tradeable 
sector contributes to reducing GDP inflation. The stylised fact of falling inflation in recent years is generated by 
continued productivity gains in the non tradeable sector but falling productivity growth in tradeables. According to 
the simulation results, the effect of increased housing demand on inflation has been relatively small
14 (not exceeding 
.4% on average in terms of explaining the inflation differential). The relatively minor impact of house prices on 
inflation is not inconsistent with the fact that despite buoyant housing demand there has been a deceleration of 
inflation in recent years.  Expansionary fiscal policy in Ireland helps to explain both the decline in the growth rate of 
investment and subdued growth in private consumption after 2000.  
 
Graph IR-1:  DSGE Results for Ireland (deviation from Euro area average) 
A: GDP, PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT










C: Inflation GDP, W AGE, TOT













B: INVESTMENT, CONSUMPTION, HOUSING
























Table IR-1:  Economic Development – Ireland (relative to euro area) 
                 
Variables                   1999      2000      2001      2002      2003      2004      2005 
 
Growth rate of real GDP            5.97      3.49      2.30      3.33      2.31       0.84      1.27 
Growth rate of private consumption      3.21      3.58      1.54      0.67      0.93       0.95      2.21 
Growth rate of investment        8.67      2.54        -0.73      5.12      4.85       5.64     10.82 
Labour productivity growth          3.25      2.95      2.72      3.98      2.03     -0.12     -0.75 
Employment rate          1.59      1.91      1.64      1.22      1.40       2.04      3.40 
Inflation (GDP)        3.16      4.05      3.29      2.47      0.02       0.33      1.38 
Wage inflation            1.99      5.57      4.83      2.47      3.32       3.42      3.21 
Growth of terms of trade                        -0.26        -1.11      0.38      0.96        -1.07        -0.33     0.37 
Current account          0.35         -0.36        -0.57        -0.99      0.00         -0.79        -1.04  
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 




                                                 
14   In the model, increased housing demand mainly leads to an increase in land prices and has less of an impact on construction because of 
wage equalisation across sectors. There are also two offsetting effects. First, an increase in housing demand is partly compensated by 
lower demand for consumer goods. Second a shift in the preference for houses increases labour supply and therefore has a dampening 
effect on wages. Finally imputed rents are not considered.    23
Summing up 
1) The model accounts reasonably well for the decline in the growth rate of GDP (per capita) from around 5% in 
1999 to about 1% in the last two years and a similar decline for productivity. The model also captures the evolution 
of employment. 
2) Concerning prices and wages, the model explains the initially high inflation differential and its convergence to the 
euro area average rate in recent years. The model is less successful in matching the terms of trade development, 
especially in recent years
15. 
3) Despite persistently high housing investment, the growth rate of Irish total investment has been declining from 
high levels in the late 1990s. This is roughly matched by the model. The model also generates a downward trend in 
consumption per capita, though it undershoots private consumption in the last two years. 
4) The model also replicates the overall decline in the current account; however it fails to match the speed of its 
deterioration in the first years of the euro area.   
 
4.3  Italy  
Stylised Facts (see table IT-1) 
Persistently low growth of GDP per capita and moderate wage developments did not induce low inflation and 
improving competitiveness in Italy. On the contrary, unit labour costs and prices continued to increase faster in Italy 
than in competitor euro-area countries, resulting in a loss of competitiveness and export market shares. The current 
account gradually deteriorated over the whole period 1997-2005, in spite of weak domestic demand.
16  
Since 1999, consumption growth has been lacklustre and broadly in line with slow GDP growth.  Investment growth 
has been supported somewhat by construction demand in view of accelerating housing prices. In recent years, 
investment growth turned negative again, mainly driven by falling equipment investment. After a sharp 
improvement in the run-up to 1999, the government budget balance has worsened considerably.  
On the supply side, slow or even negative total factor productivity growth in both the tradeable and non-tradeable 
sectors largely explains the slow growth. In particular, in the more recent years under review, labour productivity 
growth was particularly low since employment growth remained robust in spite of the negative cyclical conditions 
and TFP growth literally collapsed.   
 
Shocks 
As did other Member States with a history of devaluations and high and volatile inflation, Italy benefited from a 
reduction in the exchange risk premium when entering EMU. A conservative estimate based on deviations from 
interest parity between the lire and the Euro before 1999 suggests a risk premium of about 50BP was eliminated in 
the running up phase to EMU. This provided a stimulus to domestic demand. However, other factors played in the 
opposite direction and contributed to the lacklustre growth performance. Fiscal retrenchment to qualify for the 
Maastricht criteria implied a drag on growth in 1997 and 1998. The most important shocks we consider in the case 
of Italy concerns the continuous and accelerating reduction in TFP growth, both in the tradeable and non-tradeable 
sectors. A widespread view is that insufficient competition, especially in the service sector, low human capital 
accumulation, weak innovation and insufficient R&D expenditure are amongst the determinants of the marked 
slowdown
17 in TFP. In particular, productivity in manufacturing industry has stagnated since the mid-1990s, 
resulting in a significant and persistent differential in terms of unit labour costs with respect to euro area, and a 
concomitant deterioration of the Italian competitive position. Furthermore, low productivity growth in 
manufacturing reflects a productive specialisation in low-demand, low-technology sectors
18, where the Italian 
industry is faced with strong competition from emerging producers. As a consequence, Italy has experienced a loss 
of market share amounting to more than 40% in cumulative real terms since 1995. In addition, since 1992, the 
working age population has been in decline in Italy.  
 
Simulation (see Graph IT-1) 
The reduction in the risk premium has a strong positive effect on domestic demand in 1997 and 1998. The risk 
premium reduction does however not feed into higher GDP in this last phase of the run-up to EMU as its effects are 
                                                 
15   The increase in the terms of trade as generated by the model results from an assumed reduction in TFP growth in the tradeable sector. 
16   Note that we considered in the case of Italy also the year 1997 and 1998 in the simulation, as these were characterised by strong fiscal 
consolidation which affected economic developments after the start of the euro area.   
17   See for instance Banca d'Italia (2006).  
18   See Larch (2005) and Monti (2005).   24
outweighed by the strongly contractionary effect of fiscal policy in that period such that GDP growth remains low. 
The contribution of fiscal policy to GDP growth turns positive in 1999-2001 as the fiscal stance turns strongly 
expansionary. It remains slightly positive until 2003. Despite continued deterioration of the cyclically adjusted 
primary balances, the net effect of fiscal policy turns negative again from 2004, as the degree of crowding out of 
domestic demand generated in the model simulation exceeds the direct positive effect of net government demand.  
From 2000 onwards, the increase in the employment rate through labour market reform and as a result of the 
negative TFP growth largely counter the effects of negative population growth on the GDP growth rate. A shift in 
demand towards housing together with loosening of lending constraints allowed increasing housing prices despite 
the unfavourable economic developments and underpinned construction investment. 
The shocks to total factor productivity explain most of the low GDP growth and high inflation over the whole period 
considered. Especially from 2003 onwards, the cumulated effect of the TFP shocks weighs heavily on consumption 
and investment and reduces GDP growth by more than 1 percentage point per year. A shift in demand towards 
housing together with loosening of lending constraints helped (construction) investment.  
The deterioration in the current account is largely explained by the reduction in the risk premium and the 
competitiveness effects of the negative TFP shocks.   
Graph IT-1:  DSGE Results for Italy (deviation from Euro area average) 
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Table IT-1:  Economic Development – Italy (relative to euro area) 
Variables      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Growth rate of real GDP          -0.20     -0.97     -0.52      0.30      0.54     -0.08     -0.61     -1.22     -1.15 
Growth rate of private consumption       1.95        0.83     -0.28     -0.22     -0.61    -0.22     -0.01     -1.20     -1.02 
Growth rate of investment    -1.06     -1.52     -2.61      1.36      2.00      5.46     -2.54     -0.15     -2.86 
Labour productivity growth     -0.06     -0.45     -0.13      0.20     -0.58    -1.63     -1.82     -0.74     -0.91 
Employment rate       -0.11     -0.48     -0.78       -0.84     -0.23      0.72     1.48      1.18      1.02 
Inflation         1.19      1.06       0.47      0.60      0.61      0.82      1.04      1.02      0.34 
Wage inflation       4.34     -2.43     -0.56     -0.20      0.31     -0.36      0.19      0.98      0.63 
Growth of terms of trade     1.04      3.42       2.73      2.55      3.71      3.36      2.34      3.36      3.81 
Current account      -0.19     -1.12     -2.03     -3.20     -2.77    -3.39     -3.96    -3.58     -4.13 
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 
2. The employment rate and the current account are expressed as deviations from 1996 levels. 
3. The terms of trade are defined as export prices of the MS relative to export prices of the rest of EMU.  
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Summing up  
1) Shocks related to the creation of EMU do not explain GDP and its components nor inflation developments in 
Italy. The risk premium reduction did lead – as expected – to a deterioration of the current account; the anticipated 
higher growth rate did however not materialise.  
 
2) By adding negative shocks to TFP, the development of the main variables can be matched. Structural challenges, 
feeding into negative total factor productivity shocks thus seem the major factor behind persistently low growth and 
above average inflation. 
 
3) In addition, the fluctuations in GDP growth and its components seem to reflect to some extent fiscal policy 
behaviour: an initial sharp contraction, followed by strongly expansionary fiscal policy. From 2004 onwards, the 
crowding-out effect outweighs the direct expansionary effects of net government demand on GDP growth in the 
model simulations.      
  
4.4  The Netherlands
19 
Stylised Facts (see table NL-1) 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Dutch economy consistently grew faster than most other euro-area countries. 
Annual real GDP growth outpaced the euro-area average by 1 percentage point in the period 1996-2000. High 
growth rates were fed by strong consumption and investment growth, in particular construction. The strong growth 
period coincided with booming housing prices and a massive increase in mortgage debt. These developments, also 
fuelled by the falling nominal interest rates at the end of the 1990s, resulted in significant re-mortgaging and equity 
withdrawal that fed into private consumption expenditure. The Nederlandsche Bank estimates the annual spill-over 
effect of mortgage equity withdrawal on GDP growth via consumption expenditure at 0.5 to 1 percentage point in 
1998–2000, turning to a negative contribution of around 0.5 of a percentage point in the period 2001-2003 as equity 
withdrawal lessened
20. As a result, household financial liabilities (as a percentage of GDP) in the Netherlands almost 
doubled since 1990. On the supply side, employment and the labour share grew rapidly. Amidst symptoms of 
overheating, inflation peaked in 2000 and 2001 at more than 2 percentage points above the euro-area average. In 
2001, a period of below average growth set in the Netherlands and inflation came down to below the euro-area 
average in the later years of the period under review.  
 
Shocks 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Dutch economy had an advantageous initial competitive position, reflected in an 
undervalued real exchange rate which exacerbated and prolonged the period of strong economic growth in the 
second half of the 1990s. The effects of the undervalued exchange rate were reinforced by a sharp increase in 
household debt as debt ceilings were increased and mortgage repayment requirements loosened.
21 Household debt 
increased by about 30% of GDP since the mid 1990s. The housing boom is to some extent an autonomous demand 
shock as dual income households became more prevalent in the 1990s as female participation rates increased 
rapidly, increasing the mortgage borrowing capacity of households. A shock to debt financing and a housing demand 
shock is modelled to cover the increase in housing prices and indebtedness. Some fiscal shocks are given to reflect 
that a substantial part of windfall revenues was used to finance structural expenditure in the later phases of the 
upturn in the mistaken belief that these windfalls reflected sustainable revenue growth. In addition, data suggest that 
the Netherlands suffered from negative total factor productivity shocks at the end of the economic boom, which 
were reversed in the period 2003 to 2005. As the Dutch guilder had been credibly linked to the D-mark for over a 
decade, the Netherlands did not benefit from the disappearance of an exchange risk premium with the entry into 
EMU. As the risk premium declined in most other euro-area Member States, this implies that we need to give a 
negative shock to the risk premium in the Netherlands (as compared to the euro-area average)   
 
Simulation (see Graph NL-1) 
The real exchange rate undervaluation at the entry into EMU can explain a large part of the high consumption and 
investment growth in 1997 and 1998. As the shock is given in the simulation in a single year - rather than built-up 
                                                 
19   Note that we considered in the case of the Netherlands we include the years 1997 and 1998 in the simulation, as demand pressures built 
up during this period which had repercussions in later years after the start of the euro area.   
20  See Els,van , P.J.A , End, van den ,W.A and. Rooij, van, M.C.J (2005). 
 
21   The housing boom in the late 1990s was accompanied by a massive increase in mortgage debt, fuelled by a fiscal regime which permits 
virtually full tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments at the marginal tax rate. In combination with the liberalisation of the 
mortgage market and increased competition between mortgage providers, this led to the introduction of new mortgage products that 
postpone loan redemption until maturity (concerns around 90% of mortgages extended since 1995). Additionally, dual income 
households became more prevalent in the 1990s, increasing the borrowing capacity of households.   26
gradually through wage moderation - it distorted the terms of trade development in 1997. The undervaluation led to 
increasing external and domestic demand which resulted in price pressures. It explains up to 2.5 percentage point of 
higher GDP level in the late 1990s
22. Its effect was somewhat dampened by the loss of the negative risk premium 
compared to other euro-area Member States, which was associated with the credibility of the link to the DM. Since 
the late 1990s, prices and wages have grown faster in the Netherlands than in the rest of the euro area. Expansionary 
fiscal policy in the last phases of the long-lasting economic boom and strong consumption demand induced by the 
sharp increase in housing prices and wealth induced some overshooting dynamics.  
 
Graph NL-1:  DSGE Results for the Netherlands (deviation from euro-area average)   
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Table NL-1:  Economic Development – Netherlands (relative to euro area) 
Variables      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Growth rate of real GDP          1.10    1.20  0.71   -0.74   -0.82  -1.03     -0.72  -0.06  0.13 
Growth rate of private consumption     1.13      1.47     1.05    0.03     -0.93    -0.16   -1.62     -1.23     -0.65 
Growth rate of investment    3.95   -1.57     1.62    -3.62     -0.27     -3.07  -4.41    0.60      0.01 
Labour productivity growth     1.04     0.77     0.37    -0.22     -0.97     -0.70  0.09      1.71      0.79 
Employment rate       1.53    1.99     2.41     2.25      2.51      2.29     1.66      0.37     -0.10 
Inflation        0.66     0.19     0.70   2.52      2.84      1.27     0.51     -1.04    -0.17 
Wage inflation      2.03     3.09     0.56      1.86      2.22      1.76     1.50      1.04     0.13 
Growth of terms of trade    0.79     -1.39     -0.48      3.71      0.28     -1.82    0.22     -1.06    0.49 
Current account      0.72     -2.33     -1.39    -0.54   -0.01     0.85     0.68      0.93   2.38 
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 
2. The employment rate and the current account are expressed as deviations from 1996 levels. 
3. The terms of trade are defined as export prices of the MS relative to export prices of the rest of EMU.  
 
 
A preference shift towards housing demand and raising of the debt ceiling together with pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
can partially explain high inflation and growth in the latter phases of the upturn, leading to overshooting of 
equilibrium price and wage levels, some over-investment and strong employment growth which put the 
unemployment rate below its equilibrium level. The booming housing market in particular stimulated consumer 
demand and further fuelled the build-up of imbalances until 2001-2002. As the effect of these shocks on the faded 
out, consumption and investment dropped back to their baseline levels and the rate of inflation dropped below the 
                                                 
22   Note that while the shock to the real exchange rate is given in single year (1997), its building up (and unwinding) has been a gradual 
process.    27
euro-area average. The ending to the fiscal impulses and the subsequent fiscal tightening exacerbated the downturn. 
Together, the risk premium shock and the undervaluation of the real exchange rate explain the 2% improvement in 
the current account balance over the period considered.   
 
Summing up  
1) The simulation of a shock to the real exchange rate in the run-up to EMU explains part of high GDP growth and 
inflation in the first 2 to 3 years of the period considered.  
 
2) The undervalued real exchange rate at entry into the euro area cannot explain the differences in the growth rate of 
housing investment and the extent of the consumption growth. This effect can be captured by assuming specific 
housing demand and debt financing shocks.  
 
4.5  Portugal 
Stylised facts: (see Table PT-1) 
The Portuguese economy went through a boom in the running up phase to EMU which started soon after the mid 
90s. GDP per capita growth was exceeding that of the euro area until 1999. However since 2000 growth dropped 
below euro average levels. High growth was accompanied by rising external imbalances. Somewhat surprisingly the 
current account deficit remains high despite the recent decline of GDP growth. The boom in the late 90s was driven 
by extraordinary investment growth. Because of rising demand pressures, wage and price inflation exceeded the euro 
average by more than 5, respectively 2% p. a. in the 90s. In the meantime inflation differentials came down but so 
far they have not disappeared completely. 
 
Shocks 
We model the Portuguese development since 1997 by imposing specific demand and supply shocks. On the demand 
side there was an EMU related shock, namely the abolition of the exchange risk premium at entry into EMU (100 
BP). Portugal also experienced financial market liberalisation in the form of a reduction of credit constraints for 
housing investment. Finally one can observe a shift of demand from manufacturing to services. On the supply side a 
marked reduction in TFP growth in the non tradeable sector since the end of the 90s can be identified. NAIRU 
estimates also suggest that there has been an increase of structural unemployment from about 5% in the year 2000 to 




According to the model the reduction of the risk premium was instrumental for the investment boom and the level 
shift of private consumption (consistent with the permanent income hypothesis) and caused the current account to 
decline by about 5 percentage points from 1997 to 2000. Consistent with the data, investment grows strongly in 
1997 and 1998. There is however some overshooting of investment. After three years of strong investment, 
investment growth falls below Euro area average from 2000 onwards. From 2000 to 2002 investment growth is 
about 2% below Euro area average.   The fall in the risk premium does not explain inflation persistence beyond the 
year 2000. In order to explain above average inflation after 2000 four shocks seem relevant. First the decline in non 
tradeable TFP growth, second a rising debt ceiling, third an adverse wage shock and fourth a shift of demand to non 
tradeables.  Apart from being inflationary, the demand shocks also explain some other developments. The wage 
shock is important for capturing the trend reduction in the employment rate (relative to the euro area), which is 
however cushioned by the demand shift to non tradeables. Low TFP growth is the most important factor for low 
investment growth and also has a negative effect on employment. The reduction of the risk premium is the most 
important factor for explaining the persistent current account deficit. A non negligible effect comes from a loosening 
of credit constraints. According to the model, increasing the debt ceiling for households has contributed about .5% 
of GDP to the current account deficit in the most recent years and is the second most important factor for explaining 




As can be seen from graph PT-1, with these supply and demand shocks imposed, the model is capable of replicating 
some characteristic features of the Portuguese economic development since 1997, namely high growth of GDP and 
its components in the late 90s, followed by a sustained negative growth differential since 2000; persistently positive 
(but declining) inflation differentials relative to the euro area; initially rising and then falling terms of trade growth; 
                                                 
23   In order to capture the strong decline of GDP growth in 2003 we impose two additional shocks, namely negative TFP shock in the 
tradeable (primary) sector and a cut in government expenditures.   28
a rising current account deficit in the late 90s which stabilised at high levels around 2000 and below average 
productivity growth starting around the year 2000. 
Graph PT-1:  DSGE Results for Portugal (deviation from Euro area average) 
A: GDP,PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT














C: GDP and  WAGE INFLATION, TOT













B: INVESTMENT, CONSUMPTION, HOUSING


























Table PT-1:  Economic Development – Portugal (relative to euro area) 
Variables      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Growth rate of real GDP     1.35   1.58    0.67 -0.21 -0.12 -0.39 -1.92 -0.94 -1.06 
Growth rate of private consumption  1.61   1.86   1.52  0.29  -0.84   0.19  -1.03  0.88  0.65 
Growth rate of investment                  11.61   5.93 -0.01 -1.52 0.48  -2.01 -10.85  -1.44 -5.17 
Labour productivity growth     0.94   1.12   1.06  0.73  -0.10   0.09  -1.12  -0.48  -0.37 
Employment rate      0.30   0.71   0.56 0.05  0.11  -0.22 -0.81 -1.12 -1.60 
Inflation (GDP)      2.46   2.22   2.40  1.61 1.29   1.39  0.67 0.86 1.00 
Wage inflation      5.94   4.62   2.84  4.25 2.74   1.80  0.82 0.35 0.99 
Growth of terms of  trade               1.56          1.95          0.68        0.37      -0.47        0.20        -0.74     -0.11        -0.30 
Current account                                -2.19         -3.24        -4.77       -6.61     -6.10       -4.06       -2.29    -3.65        -5.29 
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 
2. The employment rate and the current account is expressed as deviation from 1996 levels. 
3. The terms of trade are defined as export prices of the MS relative to export prices of the rest of EMU.  
 
4.6  Spain 
Stylised Facts (see table ES-1) 
In the running up phase to EMU the currency risk premium of Spain declined and disappeared at the beginning of 
1999. Starting in the 90s the productivity performance in the non tradeable sector worsened relative to the Euro area. 
These two developments are similar to those which occurred in Portugal. However Spain differs from Portugal in a 
number of dimensions. The employment rate is still rising at an impressive pace. Since the beginning of the 90s the 
participation rate has increased by 10  percentage points and the structural unemployment rate which peaked at 
nearly 17% in the mid 90s came down to 14% in 1999 and has now reached a level of about 9%. The increase in the 
employment rate is accompanied by a strong increase in the working age population, mainly due to immigration. 
Second unlike in Portugal the housing boom in Spain is continuing, possibly fuelled by high population growth, the 
age structure of the population and a boom in tourism (in particular an increasing number of holiday homes of 
foreigners). Because of high employment growth, GDP per capita has persistently been above the Euro area average, 
despite weak productivity growth. Investment growth has outpaced the Euro area average by roughly 4% each year 
since the end of the 90s. This is mostly due to housing investment (growth rate exceeds Euro area average by about   29
9%). However corporate investment in equipment has also shown strong growth in recent years.  Inflation has 
permanently been high in Spain (about 2% above Euro area average). Wage inflation is however much more 
moderate with a differential below 1% to the euro area. High demand is also reflected in the current account balance. 
The current account deficit has reached a level above 6% in 2005. 
 
Shocks 
An important country specific shock in the case of Spain is the reduction of the exchange risk premium when 
entering EMU. A conservative estimate based on deviations from interest parity between the peseta and the Euro 
before 1999 suggests a risk premium of about 50BP was eliminated in the running up phase to EMU. This provides a 
big stimulus to investment and consumption. Housing investment has also benefited from financial market 
liberalisation as shown for example by higher household debt (increase from 42.8% (as a share of GDP) in 1999 to 
64.5% in 2005). However, other factors related to demographics, immigration and tourism also play a major role. In 
the simulation exercise all three types of housing shocks have been taken into account
24. Spain differs from the rest 
of the Euro area w. r. t. labour market trends. First we allow for different population (of working age) trends and 
second we calculate negative shocks to the wage setting rule such that the model replicates the increase in the 
employment rate. Another interesting structural development in the case of Spain is increased openness to foreign 
trade. While in the 80s Spain was the country with the lowest import penetration (import share of 16.8 in 1980 vs. 
23.1 for France (second lowest) and EUR 29.0) it has now overtaken France (30.6 for Spain vs. 27.5 for France, 
EUR: 36.3). Following the empirical trade literature, increased openness is likely to increase competition in the 
tradeable sector. In the simulations reported below this is captured by a reduction in mark ups in the tradeable sector. 
Finally we consider deviations in productivity growth in the non tradeable sector.  
 
Simulation (see Graph ES-1 and Table ES-2) 
The reduction in the risk premium has a powerful short run effect on investment and consumption. Consumption is 
increased by about 3% in the first three years of EMU and has stayed at a higher level. Housing investment has 
responded vigorously to the reduction in the risk premium. Within the first two years it has risen by about 8%, 
however afterwards housing investment gradually returns to baseline levels.
25  The risk premium can account for 
higher inflation between .5 and 1% in the first 4 years of EMU, however after 4 years the contribution of a lower 
risk premium to inflation is insignificant. Due to the level shift in demand, the risk premium shock has a rather long 
lasting effect on the current account. It is the largest individual factor in explaining the current account deficit (and 
explains a deficit of 2.5% in 2005). Other structural factors (including the lifting of credit ceilings) have a more long 
lasting effect on housing demand and on inflation (+.4% p. a. in recent years). Other significant contributions to 
inflation derive from supply side factors, namely low productivity growth in non tradeables and increased 
competition in tradeables
26 (the joint inflation effect is about .8% per year over the last three years).    
 
Summing up: 
1) Shocks related to the creation of EMU explain GDP and its components as well as inflation in the first 2 to 3 
years. The fall in the risk premium also explains a lower permanent consumption level and a more permanent current 
account deficit (of about 2.5% of GDP)  
 
2) The risk premium cannot explain sustained differences in the growth rate of housing investment. This can only be 
captured by assuming specific housing demand shocks. Increased housing demand can partially explain high 
inflation and a rising current account deficit in recent years. 
 
3) On the supply side, low TFP growth of non tradeables and increased competition in tradeables are important 
explanatory factors for inflation and the external balance in the Spanish economy.  
 
4) The increase in the employment rate is only to a limited extent explained by the shocks considered. Both the 
population increase and increased competition contribute positively to employment. However the bulk of the 
increase of the employment rate is generated by a shift in the wage setting rule consistent with the observed decline 
in structural unemployment. Increased employment in Spain contributes significantly to housing demand, 
investment and private consumption.   
 
                                                 
24   The last shock has been constructed as a residual shock to the model in order to replicate the divergent housing trend in Spain. 
25   The effect of a reduction in the risk premium is an increase in the desired housing capital stock of private households. This is realised by 
initially rising investment, followed by a period of higher investment levels and a gradual return to the baseline level of investment.  
26   An inflationary effect from increased competition in tradeables sounds counterintuitive. Indeed increased competition does not increase 
prices in the tradeable sector but it increases wages which in turn leads to higher inflation in the non tradeable sector.   30
Graph ES-1:  DSGE Results for  Spain (deviation from Euro area average) 
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Table ES-1:  Economic Development – Spain (relative to euro area) 
Variables                 1999      2000      2001      2002      2003      2004      2005 
 
Growth rate of real              1.41       0.49       0.71       0.58       1.01     -0.22      0.96 
Growth rate of private consumption      1.55       1.11       0.34       0.79       0.24       1.56       1.92 
Growth rate of investment         4.27       1.62       4.04       4.82       4.67       2.55       4.93 
Labour productivity growth           -0.81     -1.46     -0.07       0.02       0.03     -0.98     -0.79 
Employment rate            1.10       2.09       2.49       2.82       3.42       3.88       4.97 
Inflation (GDP)            1.77        2.03       1.79       1.88       1.93       2.16       2.69 
Wage inflation            -0.45       0.35       0.96       0.74       1.06       1.18       0.25 
Growth of terms of trade           -0.30     -2.95       2.15       3.13       1.29       0.19       0.79 
Current account               -1.50       -2.85     -3.08     -2.50     -2.93     -4.68     -6.23  
Source: Commission services 
Note:   1. The growth rates of GDP and its components is per capita. 
2. The employment rate and the current account is expressed as deviation from 1998 levels. 
 
5.  A possible adjustment scenario for Spain and Germany 
This section analyses how adjustment could take place in EMU after several years of asymmetric shocks. We 
analyse the cases of Spain and Germany, since these two countries experienced the largest asymmetric shocks with 
the strongest build up of net foreign debt and assets respectively since the start of EMU. In the country simulations 
this process is driven by a sequence of asymmetric shocks. The question can be raised what happens once these 
shocks stabilise. In this section we explore a scenario in which the exogenous variables stabilise gradually at their 
new levels at the end of 2007. 
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Graph ES-2:   Adjustment in Spain 
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In the case of Spain the projection assumes that three country specific developments are coming to an end within the 
next two years. First, positive demand shocks to housing investment decline gradually and disappear at the end of 
2007. Second, over the next two years, TFP growth in the non tradable sector picks up and reaches similar growth 
rates as in the Euro area. Third, positive labour market shocks (in the form of negative shocks to wages) gradually 
become smaller and disappear at the end of 2007.  
 
Under these conditions the following stylised predictions are made by the model (notice all variables are in per 
capita terms and expressed as deviation from the Euro area average). 
 
•  Investment demand (especially housing) declines strongly and undershoots Euro area investment growth 
(until 2011). The undershooting is more persistent in the case of housing investment. 
•  Growth of private consumption drops below the Euro area average (until 2015). 
•  Growth of GDP falls to the euro area average rate. 
•  A continuous rise in the employment share prevents a strong fall in GDP per capita. There are two forces 
which drive up employment. First, wage inertia from previous negative wage shocks (labour market 
reforms) and second an income effect in labour supply. The prospect of declining real consumption and 
income increases labour supply. 
•  Inflation falls rapidly and reaches the Euro area average rate in 2008. However, inflation undershoots the 
Euro average inflation by about -.5 to -1% over several years. Wage inflation drops even more strongly. 
•  The adjustment of domestic demand and inflation first prevent the current account deficit from increasing 
further and cause a decline after 2009. However, the adjustment of the current account is rather slow. The 
real exchange rate in terms of tradables starts to fall in 2007, while the real exchange rate expressed in 
terms of the GDP deflator peaks in 2007 and starts declining in 2008.  
 
This is a fairly orderly adjustment scenario. The following features are worth highlighting. Even though we are not 
assuming a collapse in housing investment, the fact that the boom is coming to an end will induce housing 
investment growth to undershoot. Inflation (especially wage inflation) also undershoots. Both features of the 
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Graph DE-2:   Adjustment in Germany 
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The scenario for Germany is based on three country specific developments. First, demand for housing will not be 
subject to negative shocks any longer (phased out over a period of two years). Second, adverse shocks to corporate 
investment will fade out until the end of 2007 and third, the above average growth of TFP in the non tradable sector 
will slowly decline. 
 
Under these conditions the following stylised predictions are made by the model. 
  
•  Investment demand (especially housing) picks up and growth of investment exceeds growth in the Euro 
area after 2008. 
•  Growth of private consumption also increases but remains fairly subdued. 
•  Growth of GDP continues to exceed growth in the euro area (note: we still have above average TFP growth 
in DE in this scenario). 
•  Employment increases slightly but does not recover losses vis-à-vis the euro area average over the period 
1999 to 2005. 
•  Wage and price inflation increases gradually, however euro-area average rates of inflation are only reached 
after 2010. 
•  External adjustment is slow. The real exchange rate for tradable rises only slightly. This is because wages 
are not rising very strongly. The continued productivity improvements in the non tradable sector contain  
labour demand and restrict wages to rise
27. 
  




                                                 
27   The real exchange rate defined in terms of the GDP deflator remains on a downward trend because of the low inflation in the non tradable 
sector.   33
Concluding remarks  
The framework allows us to replicate actual developments in euro-area Member States using a model that is 
inherently stable. We find that distinguishing between developments in the tradeable- and non-tradeable sectors 
appears crucial to understand inflation persistence. The link between inflation and competitiveness is not always 
strong. It depends on the sector in which the inflation in generated. For instance, high total factor productivity 
growth in the tradeable sector in Ireland allows high inflation without deteriorating competitiveness.    
The abolition of currency risk premia and increased capital mobility seems to have been an important driving force 
behind the current account dynamics. The absence of an exchange risk premium in EMU allows an increase in 
capital mobility resulting in a lower correlation between savings and investment. The model simulations show a 
persistent effect on the current account, which largely operates through the wealth effect and housing investment. 
The risk premia convergence led to shifts from external to domestic demand in countries in which it declined 
(Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal) with the mirror image in Germany.  
The model simulations allow some benign and reassuring explanations of the economic divergence in the early years 
of EMU. To a significant extent they can be explained by the one-off shocks related to euro-area entry. After the 
one-off adjustment following the creation of the monetary union, economic developments apparently can be 
expected to be more symmetrical though structural supply-side differences remain a source of growth differences. 
Even though adjustment in EMU may be benign and rather efficient, return to baseline growth rates may imply 
significant changes over the years to come in some Member States. For example, a normalisation of housing price 
increases may shave off excess demand in Spain, and will lead to lower consumption and investment growth and 
significantly lower growth and inflation. Also Germany may see a reversal of fortunes after a near decade of 
price/wage and current account adjustment.  
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Appendix:  A Two-Country-Three-Sector DSGE  Model
28 
 
We consider two countries within a monetary union. There is a high degree oft capital mobility within the monetary 
union. Production is distinguished in tradeables and non tradeables. The non tradeable sector is further disaggregated 
into construction and services. Labour is mobile between sectors but not between countries. The tradeable sector in 
each country produces a commodity which is an imperfect substitute for goods produced in the other country. 
Tradeables and non tradeables are themselves imperfect substitutes. In each sector there is a continuum of 
monopolistically competitive firms that set prices subject to convex adjustment costs. The household sector consists 
of a continuum of households  [] 1 , 0 ∈ h . A share  ) 1 ( slc −  of these households are not liquidity constrained and 
indexed by  [ ) slc i − ∈ 1 , 0 . They have full access to financial markets, they buy and sell domestic and foreign assets. 
The remaining share slc of households is credit constrained and indexed by  [ ] 1 , 1 slc k − ∈ . These households only 
engage in credit markets to finance housing investment. They are constrained in the sense that financial 
intermediaries charge a risk premium which depends on the value of the collateral. Both types of households sell 
labour and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive labour markets. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is 
introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for changing wages. These adjustment costs are 
borne by the household. The government sector in each region makes spending decisions and collects taxes on 
labour, capital and consumption. Finally there is a central bank which sets nominal interest rates for the whole area 





T n  firms producing tradeables indexed by j and 
N n firms producing non tradeables indexed by l. Each 
firm produces a variety of the corresponding (domestic) good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties produced 
by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistically competitive in the goods market and 
face a demand function for goods. Domestic firms sell to private domestic households, to other firms the government 
and to exporting firms. All demand sectors have identical preferences across varieties. The demand function for firm 
j  depends on its relative price to other tradeables and the total demand for tradeables which is composed of the 
demand of households, the government and firms for tradeables plus exports
29  
 
































The demand function for non tradeables is given by 




































Demand for an individual firm in the non tradeable sector depends on the relative price of the variety offered by the 
firm, aggregate household and government demand for non tradeables and investment demand of the tradeable the 
non tradeable sector and the construction sector. 
In what follows it is assumed that firms influence the demand for varieties for tradeables and non tradeables with 




t P P , . 
Output in both sectors is produced with a Cobb Douglas production function  
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− = ,  where  { } Nl Tj s , =  
 
                                                 
28          This model is an extended version of  a DSGE model estimated for the Euro area (see Ratto et al. (2006). 
29   Here we assume only firms operating in the tradeable sector invest in tradeables. Firms in the non tradeable sector invest entirely in non 
tradeables.   36
Firms rent capital and hire labour from the household sector. Labour input 
s
t N  is itself a CES aggregate of labour 


















t where the parameter  1 > θ  determines the degree of 
substitutability. The level of technology is given by 
s TFP . The objective of the firm is to maximise profits  
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CAP − + − =  , with ucap*=1. 
 
 
The firm determines labour input, the capital stock  and prices optimally in each period given the technological and 
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Firms equate the marginal product of labour, net of adjustment costs, to wage costs. As can be seen from the left 
hand side of equation (5a), the convex part of the adjustment cost function penalises in cost terms accelerations and 
decelerations of changes in employment. Equation (5b) determines the optimal capital stock by equating the 
marginal value product of capital to the rental price. Equation (12c) defines the mark up factor as a function of the 
elasticity of substitution and changes in inflation. We follow Smets and Wouters and allow for additional backward 
looking elements by assuming that a fraction (1-sfp) of firms keep prices fixed at the t-1 level. This leads to the 
following specification: 
 








t sfp sfp π π π β γ τ η − − + + − = − + ) ) 1 ( ( 1 1 1
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There are 
H n  firms  (indexed by h) in the construction sector. The construction sector simply transforms non 
tradeable inputs (
HI
t I ) into buildings (
HO








t U I I
θ , , =     with  1 ≤ θ . 
 
Firms in the construction sector also operate under monopolistic competition and adjust prices sluggishly. 
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2. Households: 
 
2.1 Non Liquidity constrained households 
 
Non liquidity constrained households decide about five types of assets, domestic and foreign nominal bonds 
(
F B B, ), stocks of domestic companies operating in the tradeable and non tradeable sector (
N T K K , ), housing (H) 
and cash balances (M). Each household owns land (L) which is inelasticaly supplied and traded among households. 
The household receives income from labour, nominal bonds and rental income from lending capital to the tradeable 
and non tradeable sector. 
 
The utility function is additively separable in consumption, leisure and the stock of housing. And the stock of 
housing is composed of buildings and land. For the model economy to attain a steady state we assume log utility for 
total consumption (
i
t C ) and housing and CES for leisure. In addition we allow for habit persistence  
 




t habcC C habc C U .   
 
Consumption is an aggregate over varieties of tradeables and non tradeables. The tradeables are nested into domestic 
and foreign varieties. 
i
t C  is a composite of tradeable 
i T
t C
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where  ρ  denotes the elasticity of substitution between tradeables and non tradeables. For tradeables households 
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t N  is labour supplied by household i. Finally the household enjoys utility from the stock of housing (HL), 
The parameter ϕ  determines how the household distributes expenditure over consumption and housing . Due to 
demographic and other changes this parameter is subject to exogenous shocks denoted by 
H
t e  
 






t HL habh HL habh e HL Z ϕ     with  , 0 > κ  
 
Housing is itself an aggregate of buildings (H) and land (L). The utility the household receives from both 
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30   It is assumed that households and the government have identical preferences over domestic and foreign varieties in order to facilitate 
aggregation.    38
The investment decisions w. r. t. real capital are subject to convex adjustment costs, therefore we make a distinction 
between real investment expenditure (I) and physical investment (J). Investment expenditure of households 
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The budget constraint is written in real terms, all prices are expressed relative to the GDP deflator (P). Investment in 
the tradeable sector is a composite of domestic and foreign tradeables (manufacturing), while we regard investment 
for non tradeables as largely non tradeable (construction). The first order conditions of the household (FOCs) with 
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All arbitrage conditions are standard, except for a trading friction on foreign bonds, which is modelled as a function 
of the ratio of net foreign assets (BW) to GDP. 
 
 
Using the arbitrage conditions, investment in the tradeable and non tradeable sector is given by 
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Notice, the relevant discount factor for the investor in the tradeable sector is the nominal interest rate minus expected 
inflation of tradeables. This is because investment in the tradeable sector is assumed to be a composite of domestic 
and foreign tradeables and an increase in tradeable inflation constitutes a capital gain for then investor and lowers 
capital costs.   
 
Similarly, for the non tradeable sector, investment is given by 
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t q  is the present discounted value of the rental rate of return from investing in the tradeable sector 




















In the case of non tradeables, the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate minus expected 
inflation of non tradeables because investment in the non tradeable sector is assumed to be a composite of domestic 
non tradeables only. 
 
Housing investment (buildings) is given by 
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q q . 
 
 
This expression shows that households aim at stabilising expenditure shares for consumption and housing (if σ  is 
close to one) which is implied by the log specification of the utility function. Investment is large if the stock of 
housing (relative to its equilibrium level) is low and vice versa. The present discounted value of  the ratio of the 
marginal utility of housing to the marginal utility of consumption is discounted with the nominal interest rate minus 
the expected inflation rate for buildings. The discount rate again reflects the impact of capital gains on housing 
investment decisions.  
 
Finally, households make decisions about the acquisition of land. Demand for land crucially depends on expected 









































The land price behaves like an asset price. Under the assumption that land is inelasticaaly supplied it jumps upwards 
if there is a positive expectation about future consumption and a positive expectation about HL, the house-land 
aggregate in the standard case where land and buildings are complements ( 1 < σ ). In the model it is especially the 





 2.2 Credit constrained households (k) 
 
Credit constrained households have identical preferences as unconstrained households, however they do not 
participate in asset markets except for mortgage market. Household k spends his income either on consumption 
goods or invests in housing. Housing investment is subject to a credit constraint. Though the household can borrow, 
however the borrowing cost depend on the ratio of outstanding debt (D) to the value of the housing stock ( ) (
H K V ) 
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where . ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 t t t i r π + + = + − −  
 
The first order conditions of credit constrained households for consumption, buildings and land are similar to those 




2.3  Wage setting 
 
Workers from each household have market power in the labour market, because they offer services, which are 
imperfect substitutes to services offered by other workers. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive 
unions indexed over the same range as households  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ h  which act as wage setters for the differentiated labour 
services. In a monopolistic labour market the elasticity of substitution between different types of labour  determines 
the mark-up of wages over the equilibrium wage. This elasticity is defined by  
 






































Now the wage setting rule can be derived taking derivatives of the Lagrangian w.r.t. wages. Using symmetry: 
t
i






















































    
 




w mup  which goes to zero as the substitutability between different types of labour 
goes to infinity Households are setting the real net consumption wage as a mark up over the value of leisure which is 
defined as the marginal utility of leisure divided by the marginal utility of consumption. That means the real 
(consumption) wage increase with an increase in the marginal utility of leisure, i. e. an increase in the supply of 
labour or a decrease in the marginal utility of consumption, i. e. an increase in consumption or permanent income of 
households. This formulation generalises the neoclassical labour supply model along two dimensions. First, because 
of imperfect substitutability between different types of labour, households can set a consumption wage which is 
above the reservation wage as determined by the value of leisure. The magnitude of the wage mark up depends on 
the degree of substitutability between varieties of labour. Second, by introducing convex wage adjustment costs 
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2.4 Aggregation 
 
The aggregate of any household specific variable 
h
t X  is given by  ∫ + − = =
1
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3.1 Fiscal  Policy 
Local governments dispose of the following fiscal instruments: On the revenue side, capital, labour and consumption 
taxes and on the expenditure side, government consumption and government transfers. The government has to obey 
an intertemporal budget constraint. The intertemporal budget constraint is guaranteed to be satisfied via a debt rule. 
I. e. the government adjusts labour taxes according to the following rule 
 
















3.2  Central bank policy rule (interest rate rule): 
Monetary policy in the Euro area is modelled via a Taylor rule which targets an EMU aggregate output gap and 
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4. Calibration: 
 
The parameter values for the model are taken from the estimated Euro area model (Ratto et al (2006)). We follow 
the trade literature in setting the trade elasticities. Accordingly we set the elasticity of substitution between tradables 
and nontradables to .4 and the elasticity between domestic and foreign tradables to 5. This is at the higher end given 
existing estimates. However we think this is justified given the fact that we are looking at trade among industrialised 
countries in the Euro area. The speed of adjustment of prices and wages is estimated to be 24 and 17 respectively. 
This can be translated into an average duration over which individual firms keep prices fixed of four to five quarters 
and an average duration over which nominal wages are kept constant of three to four quarters. This is inline with 
other estimates on the degree of nominal rigidity in the Euro area. Most notably our estimate for the speed of price 
adjustment is consistent with recent micro evidence as reported in Dhyne et al. (2006).  
 
Table A-1:  Parameter Values  
======================================================  
β    Discount  factor      .99 
habc   Consumption  habit     .8 
slc   Share of credit constrained households    .5 
risk   Credit  constraint      .01 
ρ     Elast. of subst. between tradables and non tradables  .4 
ς     Elast. of subst. between dom. and foreign tradables  5. 
κ     Inverse of labour supply elasticity      .23 
1 φ    Capital  adjustment  costs     10. 
2 φ    Investment  adjustment  costs    48. 
α    Output  elasticity  of  labour     .6 
p γ    Adjustment  costs  (prices)     24. 
w γ    Adjustment  costs  (wages)     17. 
sfp    Share of fwd looking price setters      .75 
sfpw    Share of fwd looking wage setters      .83 
π t     Monetary policy response to inflation    1.5 
y t    Monetary  policy  response  to  YGAP    0.1 
1 b     Level term in debt rule        0.003 
2 b     Difference term in debt rule      0.075 
 
======================================================== 